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INTRODUCTION 
The specter of identity theft looms over the American consumer. 
Over seventeen million Americans had their identities stolen in 2014, 
and identity theft has been the most popular complaint among 
American consumers for fifteen consecutive years.1 Accordingly, as 
consumers become more sophisticated guardians of their own 
personally identifiable information (“PII”), they are becoming 
increasingly anxious about the data security practices of corporations 
that process or store consumer data.2 In the absence of far-reaching 
congressional or administrative mandates,3 data breach litigation 
should help establish data security standards to guide entities and 
reassure consumers. Regrettably, too many consumers who bring data 
breach claims are denied standing before those claims can proceed to 
the merits because the plaintiffs cannot convince courts that they 
have suffered injuries-in-fact, even after data thieves accessed but did 
not misuse their PII.4 
In a 2013 case, Clapper v. Amnesty International,5 the Supreme 
Court affirmed that a plaintiff might be able to satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement on the grounds that the plaintiff faced a substantial 
risk of harm, rather than having to show that the harm will certainly 
occur.6 However, this decision did little to open up federal courts to 
 
 1. ERIKA HARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014, at 
1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6MV-YCD4]; 
Identity Theft Tops FTC’s Consumer Complaint Categories Again in 2014, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/02/identity
-theft-tops-ftcs-consumer-complaint-categories-again-2014 [https://perma.cc/4EQV-QBK7]. 
 2. MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES 
ABOUT PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND SURVEILLANCE 7 (May 20, 2015), http://www
.pewinternet.org/files/2015/05/Privacy-and-Security-Attitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8WVE-D3GU] (finding that just four percent of Americans are “very confident” 
and twenty-two percent are “somewhat confident” that companies or retailers that 
maintain records of their activity will keep that information private and secure). 
 3. Unfortunately for consumers, most of the data security regulations that the 
federal government promulgates either only apply to a narrow set of industries or are only 
sporadically enforced. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§	6801–6821 (2015) (covering financial 
institutions); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. §	1232g (2012) 
(protecting educational information); 42 U.S.C. §§	1320d-2, 1320d-9 (2015) (protecting 
healthcare information). 
 4. Miles L. Galbraith, Comment, Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to 
Plaintiff Standing for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1365, 1378–79 (2013) (“A survey of district court rulings in data breach cases 
reveals a history of inconsistent outcomes, but most courts support the conclusion that 
plaintiffs whose data has been breached, but not yet misused, have not suffered injury-in-
fact to satisfy the standing requirements under Article III.”). 
 5. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 1150 n.5. 
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data breach litigants. While the Court in Clapper approved the 
“certainly impending” standard as the appropriate measure of a 
future injury’s cognizability, the Court’s application of the standard 
was devoid of substantive, and particularly empirical, meaning. 
Adding to the confusion, the Court observed in a footnote that an 
alternative standard, one that insists on a “substantial risk” of future 
harm, remains viable, but the Court failed to explain how the two 
standards differ or operate together.7 Consequently, since Clapper, 
lower courts have disagreed about the requisite imminence of PII 
misuse that a consumer’s allegations must demonstrate in order for 
the consumer to establish an injury.8 
More broadly, the application of the injury-in-fact requirement 
in data breach litigation forces courts to make at least two normative 
choices that lead to doctrinal unpredictability. When applying the 
factual injury requirement, courts must decide which injuries ought to 
be cognizable and when the likelihood of an injury is sufficiently 
imminent to recognize the injury.9 This framework stands in stark 
contrast to a positive legal injury requirement that would simply ask a 
court to determine an injury’s cognizability with reference to the 
relevant substantive law.10 Instead, in making these normative 
choices, a court can easily dismiss a claim on jurisdictional grounds 
that may well be compensable under substantive law.11 This result is 
irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s modern theoretical 
justification for the injury-in-fact requirement as a restraint on the 
unconstitutional expansion of judicial power.12 
Courts could reduce doctrinal confusion in data breach litigation, 
and thus encourage more predictable outcomes, by either recognizing 
a different factual injury or by requiring only a nominal probability of 
the injury’s occurrence to render that harm sufficiently imminent. 
Professor Andrew Hessick has persuasively advocated for a low 
minimum risk requirement to render an injury sufficiently imminent 
for standing purposes.13 The ideal solution for the problems that data 
breach claims pose would be to align the proper constitutional 
standard for assessing the imminence of future harms, the 
“substantial risk” standard, with Professor Hessick’s minimum risk 
 
 7. See infra Section III.A. 
 8. See infra Section II.B. 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 231–33 (1988). 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 65–73 (2012). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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requirement.14 Nonetheless, courts can still remain faithful to 
contemporary standing doctrine and still reduce the unpredictability 
that results from their application of the normative factual injury 
requirement with a simpler solution: adopting the rule that the 
exposure of sensitive PII resulting from a data breach is itself a 
cognizable injury.15 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the origins 
of standing doctrine and the injury-in-fact requirement. Part II 
discusses how courts have applied the “certainly impending” standard 
to determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied the injury-in-fact 
requirement in Clapper and other recent data breach cases. Part III 
argues that the “certainly impending” standard applied in Clapper is 
inapposite in data breach cases, so courts should instead apply the 
alternative “substantial risk” standard. Finally, Part IV argues that 
courts should adopt the rule that the exposure of sensitive PII 
resulting from a data breach, even absent misuse of the data, is the 
applicable injury in data breach cases. Doing so would lead courts to 
reach more predictable and theoretically sound outcomes and would 
help provide corporations and consumers with practical guidance on 
reasonable data security practices. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE INJURY-IN-
FACT REQUIREMENT 
Standing doctrine derives from the Article III jurisdictional grant 
to the judiciary to hear cases or controversies.16 A “case or 
controversy” only occurs between parties that are adverse with 
respect to a particular matter.17 Standing doctrine thus purports to 
ensure that courts entertain actual disputes by mandating that truly 
adverse parties litigate a particular claim.18 To this end, “[t]o establish 
Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and 
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 
redressable by a favorable ruling.’	”19 The constitutional justification 
for standing doctrine is merely to ensure that adverse parties litigate a 
 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. III, §	2. 
 17. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911); see also Antonin Scalia, 
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (“There is no case or controversy, the reasoning has gone, 
when there are no adverse parties with personal interest in the matter.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Monsanto 
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).  
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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given matter, but in recent decades, the Court has applied standing 
doctrine as an exclusionary tool to render certain alleged injuries that 
give rise to disputes between adverse parties incapable of judicial 
resolution.20 
Standing doctrine is a relatively recent phenomenon in American 
constitutional law. The Supreme Court has only discussed standing as 
a derivation of the Article III jurisdictional grant over “cases or 
controversies” eight times in total before 1965, the first time being in 
1944.21 However, standing has since become a necessary prerequisite 
for any litigant that seeks to bring a claim before a federal court.22 
The brief discussion that follows, though not an exhaustive history of 
the doctrine, helps to explain why the Court has applied a more 
exacting factual injury test in cases, including data breach cases, that 
threaten the balance of powers between the branches of government. 
A. Early Standing Doctrine 
Before 1920, a plaintiff could bring a cognizable claim so long as 
he could allege that the defendant had violated one of his legal 
rights.23 However, as Congress began to construct the modern 
administrative state during the Progressive Era and through the New 
Deal, litigants began to bring claims that challenged new expansions 
of federal power.24 Notably, in cases where these inquiries foreclosed 
the plaintiffs’ claims, there was neither a common law right at stake, a 
private right of action created under a statute, nor a constitutional 
provision that litigants could claim was invaded through the 
challenged governmental actions.25 In concurring opinions, Justices 
Brandeis and Frankfurter sought to develop inquiries akin to modern 
standing doctrine that limited challenges from citizens who sought to 
invalidate the new statutory schemes without demonstrating a 
 
 20. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff who 
was placed in a chokehold by two officers of the Los Angeles Police Department lacked 
standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief against the city); F. Andrew Hessick, 
Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 278 (2008); see 
Scalia, supra note 17, at 882. 
 21. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992). 
 22. Hessick, supra note 20, at 276. 
 23. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 170 (“[W]hat we now consider to be the question of 
standing was answered by deciding whether Congress or any other source of law had 
granted the plaintiff a right to sue.”). 
 24. Id. at 179. 
 25. See id. at 180. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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personal stake in the matter before the Court.26 Nonetheless, the 
conception of justiciability that prevailed at that time was simple: any 
person could seek judicial redress for the invasion of a legal right.27 
B. The Growth of the Administrative State 
Modern standing doctrine has its origins in judicial 
interpretations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).28 The 
APA provides a private right of action to individuals who are injured 
because of an agency’s action.29 Under the relevant provision, “[a] 
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to review thereof.”30 Congress likely 
intended this provision to codify existing law by allowing litigants to 
bring claims that implicated agency actions and arose from one of 
three distinct legal injuries: the invasion of a common law right, the 
infringement of a statutory right, or a harm for which a governing 
statute provided a private right of action.31 
As the reach of the administrative state expanded in the 1960s, 
courts began to allow beneficiaries of agency actions to challenge 
those actions. An object of an agency action could still challenge the 
action under the prevailing legal injury test.32 However, a beneficiary 
of an agency’s regulatory action would not suffer an invasion of a 
legal right as a result of an agency’s regulation of some other actor.33 
For example, imagine that a fisher sought to challenge an 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) determination about 
whether a polluter could dump waste in a water source that supports 
her livelihood. Under that scenario, however, the EPA action would 
 
 26. Id. at 179–80; see, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 150–53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (concluding in suits “challeng[ing] 
governmental action,” that “if no comparable common-law right exists and no such 
constitutional or statutory interest has been created,	relief is not available judicially”); 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341–56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(describing the bounds of justiciability doctrine including the observation that “[t]he Court 
will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he 
is injured by its operation”). 
 27. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 180. 
 28. See id. at 181. 
 29. 5 U.S.C. §	702 (2012). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 181–82. 
 32. See id. at 184. For example, an object of an agency action could be an automobile 
manufacturer that is regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 
 33. See id. For example, a beneficiary of an agency’s regulatory action could be a 
consumer of a water source regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
2016] STANDING IN DATA BREACH CASES 207 
not have resulted in the fisher suffering a cognizable injury under the 
prevailing conception of standing doctrine. Thus, courts began to 
relax the legal injury test in order to allow a wider range of 
stakeholders to challenge administrative acts.34 
Pursuing this liberalization of access to the judiciary, in 1970, the 
Court replaced the legal injury requirement with a factual injury 
requirement that forms the basis of modern standing doctrine. In 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,35 the 
Court announced that in order to establish standing, (1) a plaintiff 
must suffer an “injury in fact” and (2) a plaintiff must prove that “the 
interest sought to be protected	.	.	.	is arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question.”36 The injury-in-fact requirement was intended 
to be a factual—and thus non-normative—inquiry that would open 
courts to a broader range of stakeholders who suffered some wrong as 
a result of administrative action.37 Since Camp, satisfying the injury-
in-fact requirement has been necessary to establish jurisdiction under 
Article III, especially in separation of powers cases.38 
C. Separation of Powers Concerns 
In 1983, while sitting on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Antonin 
Scalia authored an influential law review article, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,39 that 
would in retrospect seem prophetic. Scalia argued that standing 
doctrine is a means by which courts fulfill “their traditional 
undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against 
impositions of the majority.”40 Moreover, he asserted that the 
requirement must be applied such that only an individual who is the 
object of a challenged government action and suffers a concrete 
injury distinct from that suffered by the general public can acquire 
standing to challenge a governmental action.41 According to Scalia, a 
 
 34. See id.; see, e.g., Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 
F.2d 994, 1000–06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discussing how television viewers had standing under 
the Federal Communications Act to contest the renewal of a broadcast license). 
 35. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
 36. Id. at 152–54; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 185 (“The zone-of-interest test was 
intended to be exceptionally lenient.”). 
 37. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 230. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See generally Scalia, supra note 17 (discussing standing’s role in separation of 
powers cases). 
 40. Id. at 894. 
 41. Id. at 895. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
208 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
court applies the injury-in-fact requirement in separation of powers 
cases to ensure that a plaintiff is the person to whom the framers 
intended to provide judicial—rather than political—redress.42 
Therefore, in such cases, he asserted that a court would apply the 
injury test in a more exacting manner as a jurisdictional requirement 
in order to safeguard the constitutional role of the judiciary.43 
After joining the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife44 reflected the philosophical 
conceptualization of standing that he expressed years before.45 In 
Lujan, the plaintiffs brought a citizen suit under the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”).46 The ESA required the federal 
government to consult with the secretary of the interior to ensure that 
the expenditure of federal funds did not “jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species.”47 In 1978, the secretary of 
commerce and the secretary of the interior promulgated a joint 
regulation that applied the ESA to federal expenditures in foreign 
nations,48 but the U.S. Department of the Interior changed that 
position in a subsequent regulation issued in 1986.49 
In seeking a declaratory judgment that the second regulation 
violated the ESA, members of the plaintiff environmental 
organizations claimed that they had observed specific endangered 
species in their habitats and that they intended to do so again.50 
However, the plaintiffs could not attest to when their return visit 
would occur, and therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff 
organizations had failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.51 
The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ injuries were not “certainly 
impending” as required under standing doctrine because the plaintiffs 
failed to introduce evidence that would render their stated intent to 
return to the foreign nations sufficiently imminent.52 
 
 42. Id. at 894–95 (explaining that “there is no reason to remove the matter from the 
political process and place it in the courts” simply because a plaintiff may care more about 
the generalized injury than others). 
 43. See id. at 895. 
 44. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 45. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 46. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–58. 
 47. Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §	1536(a)(2) (1988)). 
 48. Id. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 874, 874 (Jan. 4, 1978)).  
 49. Id. at 558–59 (citing 50 C.F.R §	402.01 (1991)). 
 50. Id. at 563–64. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (“[T]he affiants’ profession of an ‘inten[t]’ to return to the places they had 
visited before—where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to 
observe animals of the endangered species—is simply not enough. Such ‘some day’ 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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D. Applying Lujan’s Exacting Standing Inquiry in a Recent Case 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court applied 
the “certainly impending” standard outlined in Lujan, which has since 
become the leading standard for determining whether an increased 
risk of future harm is sufficiently imminent for standing purposes.53 In 
Clapper, several organizations challenged the federal government’s 
communications surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”).54 Under FISA, the federal 
government can obtain an order from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that authorizes the government to 
intercept communications targeted toward “persons reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign 
intelligence information.”55 The respondent organizations asserted 
that their members communicated with individuals who were likely 
targets of FISA-authorized surveillance.56 As a result, the respondent 
organizations argued that their ability to “communicate confidential 
information” was compromised, that they were forced to cease having 
certain conversations, and that they were compelled to “undertake[] 
‘costly and burdensome measures’	” to ensure that sensitive 
communications would remain private.57 
Even though the respondent organizations alleged concrete 
harms resulting from FISA-authorized surveillance, the Court held 
that those harms were not “certainly impending.”58 In so holding, the 
Court reasoned that the respondents could not demonstrate that the 
federal government would target their particular communications 
because FISA prohibited the government from targeting domestic 
members of their organizations.59 Furthermore, the Court stated that 
the respondents could not anticipate that the government would 
target any particular foreign individual with whom the organizations 
might communicate because the organizations had no actual 
 
intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of 
when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury 
that our cases require.” (alteration in original)). 
 53. Unlike Lujan, Clapper is a data collection case. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1144 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §	1881a(a) (2012)).  
 56. Id. at 1145. 
 57. Id. at 1145–46 (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 
(No. 11-1025). 
 58. Id. at 1150. 
 59. Id. at 1148. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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knowledge of the government’s targeting practices.60 Even if the 
government did target individuals with whom the respondents 
communicated, the Court concluded that the organizations could not 
demonstrate that the FISC would authorize the government to do so, 
that the government’s data collection would succeed, or that the 
intercepted communications would include the respondents’ 
communications with a targeted individual.61 Finally, because the 
respondents could not demonstrate concrete injury, the Court 
decided that the respondents’ efforts to avoid FISA-authorized 
surveillance were not “fairly traceable” to the challenged government 
acts.62 
Clapper is critical to the analysis that follows for two reasons. 
First, Clapper is a separation of powers case in that the plaintiffs 
sought to invoke the power of the federal courts to invalidate a law 
that Congress duly enacted.63 In such cases, the Court explicitly 
applies standing doctrine in an “especially rigorous” manner;64 thus, 
the rationale for applying a similarly exacting inquiry in common law 
claims between two private parties is lacking. Second, Clapper 
specifically preserves an alternative standard to determine whether a 
future injury is sufficiently imminent for standing purposes. 
According to the Court, a plaintiff can also establish standing by 
showing that there is a “substantial risk” that a future harm will 
occur.65 Unfortunately, the Court utterly failed to distinguish the 
“certainly impending” and “substantial risk” standards, and as a 
result, the Court did not instruct lower courts on the proper 
application of either.66 This failure has produced confusion among 
lower courts. 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1149–50. 
 62. Id. at 1151 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting 
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly 
impending.”). 
 63. See id. at 1146–47. 
 64. Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)). 
 65. Id. at 1150 n.5. 
 66. See id. (“Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is 
literally certain that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have 
found standing based on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt 
plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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II.  LOWER COURTS APPLYING CLAPPER HAVE REACHED 
VARYING RESULTS 
When applying Clapper, lower courts have imposed a more 
rigorous test on data breach victims who assert that their injuries 
result from an increased risk of future harm, regardless of whether 
the separation of powers exacting inquiry is triggered. Plaintiffs in 
data breach cases often allege injuries that arise from one of three 
factual circumstances: (1) unauthorized access to their PII, (2) misuse 
of their PII, or (3) misuse of their PII that results in direct economic 
loss.67 When a plaintiff claims that a data breach has resulted in direct 
economic loss, such as a fraudulent charge on a credit card account 
that will not be reimbursed, courts have agreed that the plaintiff has 
alleged a cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing.68 Similarly, 
when a plaintiff asserts that a data breach has not resulted in direct 
economic harm but nonetheless results in a form of misuse, such as an 
attempt to open a bank account using the plaintiff’s identity, most 
courts seem to agree that a plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact.69 
However, when a plaintiff alleges that an unauthorized party has 
accessed but not yet misused her data, courts disagree on whether 
that plaintiff has alleged a cognizable injury.70 Furthermore, under 
Clapper’s holding that the plaintiffs in that case could not 
“manufacture standing by incurring costs in anticipation of non-
 
 67. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 68. See, e.g., Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 580–81 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015) (holding that a plaintiff did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement because she 
failed to allege that the fraudulent charges that she suffered after a data breach were not 
reimbursed); Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D. Ala. 
2014) (noting that an “allegation that the charges on [plaintiff’s] account were not 
forgiven, and [plaintiff] had to pay for the charges” would satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement). 
 69. See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that plaintiffs bringing suit based on stolen credit card numbers satisfied the 
injury-in-fact requirement because the hack was presumably intended to make fraudulent 
charges or to assume the consumers’ identities); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup 
Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 31 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Plaintiffs who claim that 
their information was, in fact, accessed and misused have alleged an actual injury.”). 
 70. Compare In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (“[T]o require Plaintiffs to wait until they actually suffer identity theft or credit card 
fraud in order to have standing would run counter to the well-established principle that 
harm need not have already occurred or be ‘literally certain’ in order to constitute injury-
in-fact.”), with Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 657 (S.D. Ohio 
2014) (holding “that the increased risk that Plaintiffs will be victims of identity theft [or] 
identity fraud	.	.	.	at some indeterminate point in the future does not constitute injury 
sufficient to confer standing where, as here, the occurrence of such future injury rests on 
the criminal actions of independent decisionmakers”). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
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imminent harm,”71 most courts have held that a plaintiff who takes 
preventative measures such as subscribing to a credit monitoring 
service also fails to suffer an injury-in-fact.72 
Before Clapper, there was a clear circuit split on the question of 
whether a plaintiff in a data breach case could demonstrate that the 
plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact without alleging actual misuse of 
the stolen PII.73 But even though Clapper now controls, only one 
appellate court has applied that case’s “certainly impending” standard 
in data breach litigations.74 That Seventh Circuit decision, Remijas v. 
Neiman Marcus Group, LLC,75 and similar opinions from district 
courts in the Ninth Circuit,76 suggest that a circuit split may soon re-
emerge on the question of whether a plaintiff can satisfy the injury-in-
fact requirement without alleging actual misuse of PII.77 Resolving 
this question is essential because data breach claims are often brought 
when the thieves actually misuse the stolen PII, and identity thieves 
can wait an indefinite period of time to fraudulently use the data.78 
Thus, a requirement that all plaintiffs suffer actual misuse of their PII 
following a data breach could prevent prospective plaintiffs from 
bringing viable state law claims until years after their data has been 
stolen.79 Courts should instead relax the standing inquiry so that 
consumers can vindicate their interests as the applicable law permits, 
even if the consumer has not suffered actual misuse of his or her PII. 
 
 71. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 72. See, e.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047, at *19–22 
(E.D. La. May 4, 2015). 
 73. Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“The 
Court recognizes that before Clapper, a split existed among the Third, Seventh and Ninth 
circuit courts over whether the increased risk of harm stemming from a data security 
breach constitutes imminent injury under Article III.”). 
 74. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 692–94. 
 75. 794 F.3d 688. 
 76. See, e.g., In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213–14 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (discussing difficulties courts may face when interpreting Clapper). 
 77. See infra Part II.A. 
 78. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 694 (“[S]tolen data may be held for up to a year or 
more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold 
or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years.” 
(quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL 
INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING 
IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 29 (2007))).  
 79. See id. at 693–94 (discussing that an alleged risk of future harm was sufficient at 
the motion to dismiss stage and allowing the case to proceed). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 201 (2016) 
2016] STANDING IN DATA BREACH CASES 213 
A. Not All Courts Agree That Actual Misuse Is the Relevant Harm 
Since Clapper, most district courts that sit in circuits other than 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have concluded that the injury-in-fact 
requirement is not satisfied unless the plaintiff can allege actual 
misuse of the plaintiff’s PII.80 Misuse can take the form of an 
unauthorized charge to a credit card, filing a fraudulent tax return, or 
an attempt to open an account using the stolen PII.81 Interestingly, 
since Clapper, at least four district courts have concluded that actual 
misuse is insufficient to demonstrate an injury-in-fact.82 In addition to 
misuse, these courts required plaintiffs to allege that they suffered 
misuse that resulted in direct economic loss.83 
For various reasons, the four cases where courts have demanded 
direct economic loss in addition to misuse appear to have limited 
precedential value. In one of these cases, despite alleged misuse, the 
court held that the plaintiff’s alleged future injury was not imminent 
in part because the plaintiff filed the claim thirty-six months after the 
data breach incident occurred.84 Another case, In re Barnes & Noble 
Pin Pad Litigation,85 was decided by a district court within the 
Seventh Circuit and was therefore overruled by Neiman Marcus.86 
In the two remaining cases where courts required a showing of 
economic harm in addition to actual misuse, the courts explicitly 
required the plaintiff to demonstrate that her economic harm would 
not be reimbursed. In one of those cases, Whalen v. Michael Stores 
Inc.,87 the court curiously placed primary reliance on In re Barnes & 
Noble even after the Neiman Marcus decision,88 applied one case 
whose analysis contradicted the rule that the court announced in 
 
 80. See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (observing that “most [courts] have agreed that the mere 
loss of data—without evidence that it has been either viewed or misused—does not 
constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing”). 
 81. See, e.g., Tierney v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 13-CV-6237, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 158750, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2014) (concluding that some plaintiffs in the 
case had established Article III standing under the Clapper standard because someone had 
attempted to access their bank accounts and opened new cell phone accounts). 
 82. See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
 83. See, e.g., Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D. 
Ala. 2014). 
 84. Fernandez v. Leidos, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1087–88 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 85. No. 12-CV-8617, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013). 
 86. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 87. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 88. Id. at 580–81. 
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Whalen,89 and applied another case (also from a district court in the 
Seventh Circuit that was decided before Neiman Marcus) where the 
court in fact rejected the contention that the plaintiffs had to prove 
that they incurred unreimbursed expenses at the pleading stage.90 
Interestingly, in the other case where a court required the plaintiff to 
prove that his asserted economic harm would not be reimbursed, 
Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc.,91 the court applied Alabama 
common law on tort damages instead of standing doctrine to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s asserted injuries were cognizable.92 
The Burton court’s application of a legal injury test to determine 
whether the plaintiff in that case established injury-in-fact does not fit 
within the Supreme Court’s current reliance on a factual injury test. 
Still, applying the legal injury test helped the Burton court reach a 
more theoretically sound result, which can provide guidance for 
future courts dealing with similar cases.93 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Application of Clapper in Neiman Marcus 
and Similar Decisions from District Courts Within the Ninth 
Circuit 
1.  Neiman Marcus 
Neiman Marcus is the first federal appellate opinion that applied 
Clapper to determine whether asserted injuries arising from a data 
breach satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement. In Neiman Marcus, 
the retailer discovered that a data breach caused up to 350,000 
payment cards to be exposed to unauthorized parties.94 Nine 
thousand two hundred of those cards were misused, so the retailer 
offered one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft 
protection to all individuals whose cards were potentially 
 
 89. Id. at 581. Whalen applied a higher standard than the standard applied in In re 
Target Corp. Data Securities Breach Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014), 
which did not require a demonstration of actual unreimbursed economic harm. Whalen, 
153 F. Supp. at 581. 
 90. Whalen, 153 F. Supp. at 581 (citing In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litig., 830 F. 
Supp. 2d 518, 527 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). 
 91. 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2014). 
 92. Id. at 1284–85 (“Because Resnick does not provide clear direction with respect to 
[plaintiff’s] pleading obligation in this consumer data theft action and because Alabama 
law governs [plaintiff’s] negligence claim, the Court turns to Alabama law for guidance.”). 
But see Smith v. Triad of Ala., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW-PWG, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 132514, at *20–23 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 22, 2015) (declining to apply Burton in a data 
breach case). 
 93. See infra Part III. 
 94. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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compromised.95 In response to the breach, several individuals filed 
purported class action complaints that sought to represent all 
consumers whose data was breached and that relied on several 
common law causes of action.96 The complaints were later 
consolidated, and the named plaintiffs of the purported class alleged 
distinct factual harms: two named plaintiffs alleged that fraudulent 
charges appeared on their payment card accounts, one plaintiff 
alleged that her bank informed her that “her debit card had been 
compromised,” and another plaintiff alleged that her card was 
potentially exposed in the breach.97 The district court dismissed the 
consolidated complaint for lack of standing.98 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that two of the plaintiffs’ 
asserted future injuries sufficed to establish injury-in-fact for all 
plaintiffs whose data was potentially exposed in the breach because 
the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries demonstrated an increased risk of 
identity theft and the necessary present cost of preventative measures 
to detect identity theft.99 To reach these holdings, the court applied 
the “substantial risk” standard that Clapper explicitly preserved.100 In 
holding that the increased susceptibility to identity theft satisfied the 
“substantial risk” standard, the court reasoned that the hackers who 
stole consumer data must have intended to use that data for 
fraudulent purposes.101 The court’s holding that the cost of a 
preventative measure—credit monitoring—was an independent 
cognizable injury is significant because it rests on a factual distinction 
with Clapper that could apply in future data breach cases. 
In Clapper, the Supreme Court concluded that costs incurred to 
prevent a non-imminent harm could not constitute actual harm.102 
The Court justified its conclusion by reasoning that a decision to 
allow mitigation expenses to constitute actual harm would allow a 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 690–91. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No. 14 C 1735, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129574, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014). 
 99. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 693–96. 
 100. Id. at 693. 
 101. Id. (“Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent 
charges or assume those consumers’ identities.”). 
 102. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152 (2013) (“Because 
respondents do not face a threat of certainly impending interception	.	.	.	the costs that they 
have incurred to avoid surveillance are simply the product of their fear of surveillance 
[and]	.	.	.	such a fear is insufficient to create standing.”). 
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plaintiff to “manufacture standing.”103 However, the Seventh Circuit 
read that conclusion narrowly, stating that the rule in Clapper did not 
apply in Neiman Marcus because, unlike the plaintiffs in Clapper, the 
Neiman Marcus plaintiffs could confirm that they were exposed to an 
independently cognizable risk of harm because they were offered 
credit monitoring services as a preventative measure.104 Thus, in 
holding that the cost of credit monitoring was itself a cognizable 
harm,105 the Seventh Circuit noted that Neiman Marcus’s decision to 
offer free credit monitoring for one year to consumers whose data 
had been potentially exposed indicated that the consumers’ concern 
of impending identity theft was not purely speculative.106 
Neiman Marcus suggests two rules that could possibly help 
district courts reach more uniform and perhaps doctrinally sound 
results in determining whether data breach plaintiffs can establish 
standing. The first rule would be that actual misuse is a sufficiently 
imminent harm whenever it is apparent that the data thief 
purposefully stole PII.107 That rule is enticingly simple and entirely 
reconcilable with several recent district court opinions.108 
 
 103. Id. at 1151 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting 
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly 
impending.”). 
 104. Neiman Marcus, 794 F.3d at 694 (“[I]t is important not to overread	Clapper. 
Clapper	was addressing speculative harm based on something that may not even have 
happened to some or all of the plaintiffs. In our case, Neiman Marcus does not contest the 
fact that the initial breach took place.	An affected customer, having been notified by 
Neiman Marcus that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to subscribe to a service 
that offers monthly credit monitoring.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 693–94. The District Court for the District of Maryland has endorsed a 
similar test:  
[I]n the data breach context, plaintiffs have properly alleged an injury in fact 
arising from increased risk of identity theft if they put forth facts that provide 
either (1) actual examples of the use of the fruits of the data breach for identity 
theft, even if involving other victims; or (2) a clear indication that the data breach 
was for the purpose of using the plaintiffs’ personal data to engage in identity 
fraud.  
Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., No. TDC-15-2125, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66404, at 
*15 (D. Md. May 19, 2016). The court indicated that the nature of the compromised PII, 
the methods that data thieves use, and confirmation of whether the data has been stolen 
may all indicate the data thieves’ purpose. See id. at *16–17.  
 108. See, e.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047, at *15–19 
(E.D. La. May 4, 2015) (noting that plaintiffs did not have standing because no actual 
misuse of PII occurred); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 
45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding that there was no evidence of actual 
misuse of PII because of the thief’s lack of sophistication, meaning the plaintiffs did not 
have standing). From these and other cases, it appears as though some courts treat a data 
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Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that courts can apply such a 
conclusory test in a consistent manner. Data thieves’ identities and 
therefore their intentions are often unknown; thus, even a hacker who 
accesses the PII of a large number of consumers could hack into a 
system for some purpose other than to defraud consumers. The 
second rule Neiman Marcus offers would be that the cost of a 
preventative measure like credit monitoring is always a cognizable 
harm. To avoid violating the rule announced in Clapper that 
mitigation expenses do not constitute actual harm, courts could limit 
the application of this second Neiman Marcus rule to cases where 
sensitive PII—and not just benign information like a consumer’s 
name and address—is exposed. 
2.  District Courts Within the Ninth Circuit 
Three district courts that sit within the Ninth Circuit have also 
held that a consumer whose data is disclosed to unauthorized parties 
because of a data breach can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement 
without alleging misuse.109 In reaching those holdings, each of those 
courts applied a Ninth Circuit case, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,110 
that was decided before Clapper. In Krottner, the Ninth Circuit 
applied a less exacting test for demonstrating legal injury on a theory 
of increased risk of future harm.111 The plaintiffs in Krottner were 
among 97,000 Starbucks employees whose “unencrypted names, 
addresses, and social security numbers” were contained on a laptop 
that was stolen from the company.112 After the laptop was stolen, the 
plaintiff employees enrolled in free credit monitoring services that 
Starbucks offered, and just one employee reportedly suffered 
misuse.113 Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations 
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.114 In so holding, the court 
reasoned that “the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted 
personal data” was a “credible threat of real and immediate harm” 
and therefore sufficed to establish standing.115 
 
thief’s apparent intent or ability to steal financial data as contributing to the imminence of 
impending identity theft. 
 109. See infra notes 116–25 and accompanying text. 
 110. 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 111. See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 112. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1140. 
 113. Id. at 1141 (noting that someone attempted to open a bank account using an 
employee’s social security number). 
 114. Id. at 1143. 
 115. Id. 
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Each of the three district courts that found standing without 
allegations of misuse applied Krottner in similar factual circumstances 
to reach the same conclusion.116 In the first case, In re Sony Gaming 
Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation,117 the plaintiffs 
were video game consumers who “provide[d] Sony with personal 
identifying information, including their names, mailing addresses, 
email addresses, birth dates, credit and debit card information	.	.	.	and 
login credentials.”118 Sony was subsequently hacked, and the plaintiffs 
alleged that their financial information was compromised, although 
only one of the plaintiffs alleged misuse.119 In another case, Corona v. 
Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.,120 the plaintiffs were Sony 
Entertainment employees who alleged that their personal—including 
financial—information was stolen in a data breach and posted on file 
sharing websites accessible to identity thieves.121 The plaintiffs also 
alleged that the stolen information was used to send threatening e-
mails to the employees and their families.122 Finally, in In re Adobe 
Systems Privacy Litigation,123 customers supplied payment card 
information that hackers stole and subsequently decrypted, and at 
least some of the information later appeared on the Internet.124 The 
Adobe court offered the most persuasive rationale for concluding that 
the risk of identity theft for plaintiffs whose sensitive PII was exposed 
have inherently suffered a sufficiently imminent harm: “[T]o require 
Plaintiffs to wait until they actually suffer identity theft or credit card 
fraud to have standing would run counter to the well-established 
principle that harm need not have already occurred or be ‘literally 
certain’ in order to constitute injury-in-fact.”125 
However, not every district court within the Ninth Circuit has 
reached the same conclusion as the three aforementioned courts. In 
factually distinct cases, other district courts within the Ninth Circuit 
have not found that plaintiffs suffered cognizable injuries, despite 
 
 116. Corona v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
85865, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 15, 2015); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1197, 1211–14 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. 
Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961–62 (S.D. Cal. 2014); see infra notes 117–25 and 
accompanying text. 
 117. 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 118. Id. at 954. 
 119. Id. at 955–58. 
 120. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85865 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015).  
 121. Id. at *2, *5. 
 122. Id. at *6. 
 123. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 124. Id. at 1215. 
 125. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013)). 
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asserting that personal information was disclosed in data breaches.126 
In those cases, the courts’ analyses turned on the following 
considerations: the length of time between the date on which the data 
breach occurred and the complaint was filed,127 the plaintiffs’ failure 
to assert that financial information was breached,128 and the plaintiffs’ 
failure to assert that any of their financial information that was 
breached was capable of misuse.129 These cases seem to support a 
general rule that an increased risk of harm arising from a data breach 
is a cognizable injury-in-fact, even without an explicit showing of 
misuse, when the plaintiff alleges that the breach resulted in an 
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive PII that is capable of misuse and 
the plaintiff files the claim in a reasonably expeditious manner. 
C. Explaining the Divergent Outcomes 
1.  Ripeness Concerns 
Federal courts may be declining to recognize factual injuries in 
data breach cases because those courts believe that the claims are not 
ripe for adjudication.130 Because ripeness doctrine prevents judicial 
review when an injury is speculative and may never occur,131 ripeness 
and standing often appear to be conflated inquiries that observers 
struggle to differentiate.132 It is possible that courts are applying 
ripeness considerations under the guise of standing doctrine in an 
attempt to determine when parties should litigate these claims, as 
opposed to determining whether the parties are sufficiently adverse, 
as standing doctrine requires. However, in data breach cases, the rule 
of decision from the applicable precedent already supplies a simple 
 
 126. See, e.g., Foster v. Essex Prop. Tr., No. 5:14-CV-05531-EJD, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 159573, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015); Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-
CV-01175-LB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141945, at *29–30 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015); 
Fernandez v. Leidos, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1086–87 (E.D. Cal. 2015).  
 127. See Fernandez, 127 F. Supp. 3d at 1087–88. This factor could be relevant to the 
imminence inquiry on the grounds that a prolonged period after PII exposure but before 
misuse suggests that a hacker did not intend to misuse PII at all. That analysis, however, 
seems purely speculative since courts cannot ascertain an unidentifiable data thief’s intent.  
 128. See Foster, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159573, at *8. 
 129. See Antman, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141945, at *29–30. 
 130. As noted, “[The] ripeness doctrine seems to separate matters that are premature 
for review because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those cases that are 
appropriate for federal court action.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
119 (6th ed. 2012). 
 131. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992). 
 132. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 119–20 (“Although the phrasing makes the 
questions of who may sue and when they may sue seem distinct, in practice there is an 
obvious overlap between the doctrines of standing and ripeness.”). 
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answer to the question of whether the parties are seeking to litigate a 
matter that is capable of redress.133 Therefore, courts should look to 
substantive law—and not to justiciability doctrines—to make this 
determination. 
2.  Docket Control 
Similarly, district courts could also be applying standing doctrine 
in data breach cases as a mechanism to control their dockets. As the 
number of data breach incidents continues to increase, judges could 
reasonably anticipate that the number of data breach claims would 
increase dramatically under a more permissive standing inquiry. 
Hearing such claims would force courts across the country to spend 
limited resources on complex and often novel questions of state 
law.134 Thus, courts could function more efficiently by limiting the 
number of data breach claims that are allowed to reach the merits. 
Even if courts are taking this approach, however, the injury 
requirement is a poor vehicle for docket control. The Supreme Court 
has insisted that the existence of a factual injury is a constitutional 
requirement and not merely a prudential consideration that courts 
can require at their discretion.135 Thus, when courts do apply the 
injury-in-fact requirement in data breach litigation, they are creating 
precedent regarding the cognizability of future injuries that could 
affect all types of claims outside of the data breach context. 
Therefore, courts should look to the merits of a claim to ensure that 
prudential considerations that weigh in favor of a certain disposition 
in a data breach case do not effectively become constitutional 
requirements that could bar an otherwise cognizable claim in another 
type of case. 
III.  THE “CERTAINLY IMPENDING” STANDARD IS INAPPOSITE IN 
DATA BREACH LITIGATION 
The federal courts’ divergent application of injury standards in 
data breach litigation reveals that there is widespread confusion 
regarding the cognizability of an increased risk of future harm as an 
 
 133. See infra Part IV. 
 134. Compare Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(concluding that Maine negligence law allows recovery for financial losses such as 
“identity theft insurance and replacement card fees” as mitigation damages so long as they 
are reasonable), with Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 Fed. App’x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding that actual loss is a necessary element of a negligence claim under Washington 
law). 
 135. See supra Part I. 
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injury-in-fact. The Supreme Court contributed to this confusion in 
Clapper by simultaneously applying the “certainly impending” 
standard from Lujan to determine the cognizability of such an injury, 
declaring that an impending harm need not be “literally certain” to be 
cognizable, and concluding that the “substantial risk” standard could 
also be applied in the same inquiry.136 Specifically, after noting that 
the “substantial risk” standard remained good law, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs in Clapper would fail that standard due 
to the “attenuated chain of inferences necessary to find harm” in that 
case.137 Disappointingly, however, the Court failed to provide any 
guidance to help lower courts understand the difference between the 
“certainly impending” standard and the “substantial risk” standard.138 
While the Supreme Court has failed to coherently explain why it 
applied the more rigorous “certainly impending” standard in Clapper, 
it is likely that the more exacting inquiry was applied because Clapper 
was at its heart a separation of powers case in which the plaintiffs 
looked to the federal courts to invalidate a law passed by Congress.139 
Thus, insofar as the “certainly impending” standard requires a high 
probability of a harm’s occurrence to render the harm cognizable, 
that standard is inapposite in data breach litigation that does not 
involve a separation of powers issue.140 Even if a risk need not be 
substantial for Article III purposes, an application of the “substantial 
risk” standard that requires a harm’s occurrence to be minimally 
probable is better suited for these disputes between private parties. In 
this way, more claims would rise or fall according to the bounds of the 
underlying substantive law. 
 
 136. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147, 1150 n.5 (2013) (discussing 
the “certainly impending” standard outlined in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555 (1993), and noting that an injury does not have to be “certainly” or “clearly” 
impending to be cognizable). 
 137. Id.  
 138. See id. (acknowledging that the “substantial risk” standard is distinct from the 
“clearly impending” standard but failing to elaborate on this distinction). Moreover, the 
Court perpetuated this indecision when it acknowledged that both standards remain good 
law in a subsequent case but failed to explain how courts should apply these two different 
standards. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (“An 
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or 
there is a ‘	“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’	” (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 
1150 n.5)). 
 139. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 140. See infra Section III.A.1. 
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A. The Unhelpfulness of “Certainly Impending” 
The Supreme Court’s inconsistent explanation of the “certainly 
impending” standard’s meaning has rendered the term superfluous. In 
formulating the injury-in-fact requirement, the Court has repeatedly 
stated that a threatened harm must be “actual or imminent.”141 In 
Clapper, the Court explained that imminence “ensure[s] that the 
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the 
injury is certainly impending.”142 However, the words “imminent” and 
“impending” mean essentially the same thing.143 Therefore, 
“certainly” is the operative term in the standard and must have been 
intended to add some clarity to the matter.144 Confusingly, in Clapper, 
the Court went on to explain that a threatened harm need not be 
“literally certain” in order to be a cognizable injury.145 The term 
“certainly” is entirely capable of accommodating more than one 
meaning,146 but if the Court insists that the term’s literal meaning does 
not control, then the Court’s failure to offer anything more than “not 
too speculative” as a definition147 may explain lower courts’ confusion 
on the standard’s application. 
The Court’s prior applications of the “certainly impending” 
standard also do not add clarity to the standard’s precise meaning. 
The Clapper majority opinion cited Lujan and Whitmore v. 
Arkansas148 to support its statement that the imminence requirement 
necessitates a showing that an asserted injury is “certainly 
impending.”149 In Lujan, the plaintiffs alleged that they intended to 
travel to the location where they would be subjected to the future 
harm, but the plaintiffs did not allege a specific time at which they 
planned to return.150 As a result, Justice Breyer argued in his dissent 
 
 141. E.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1993) (quoting Whitmore v. 
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
 142. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2). 
 143. Compare Imminent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 621 (11th 
ed. 2003) (defining “imminent” as “ready to take place”), with Impend, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra, at 623 (defining “impend” as “to be about 
to occur”).  
 144. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. The Court indicated that “certain” was the 
operative term in its elaboration of imminence indicated by its italicization of the word. Id. 
 145. Id. at 1150 n.5. 
 146. But see MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 227 (1994) (“When 
the word ‘modify’ has come to mean both ‘to change in some respects’ and ‘to change 
fundamentally’ it will in fact mean neither of those things.”). 
 147. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992).  
 148. 495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
 149. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147. 
 150. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (stating that the plaintiffs’ assertion that they would return 
“soon” did not sufficiently qualify as imminent).  
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that the Court’s conclusion that the asserted future harm was not 
“certainly impending” resulted from the Court’s application of the 
standard as a measure of temporality.151 In Whitmore, the plaintiff’s 
injury relied on an exceedingly “speculative” series of implausible 
events,152 and on that ground, the Court declined to recognize an 
injury-in-fact.153 Whitmore was also notable because it was the first 
case where the Court construed the “certainly impending” standard 
as a necessary measure of cognizable harm.154 
The most logical way to read the Court’s applications of the 
“certainly impending” standard is, however, that it refers to a 
sufficient, but not necessary, measure of probabilistic harm.155 If one 
 
 151. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the Lujan Court 
used the “certainly impending” term “as if it concerned when, not whether, an alleged 
injury would occur”). To the extent the construction of “certainly impending” in Lujan did 
contemplate whether the alleged injury would occur, the Court also seemed to limit this 
consideration to circumstances where the plaintiff controls the likelihood of the relevant 
occurrence. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (“Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat 
elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the 
alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly 
impending.’ It has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff 
alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the 
injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control.” (citations omitted)). 
 152. In Whitmore v. Arkansas, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed this “speculative” 
series of events in humorous detail:  
Whitmore’s principal claim of injury in fact is that Arkansas has established a 
system of comparative review in death penalty cases, and that he has “a direct and 
substantial interest in having the data base against which his crime is compared to 
be complete and to not be arbitrarily skewed by the omission of any other capital 
case.” Although he has already been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, 
has exhausted his direct appellate review, and has been denied state post-
conviction relief, petitioner suggests that he might in the future obtain federal 
habeas corpus relief that would entitle him to a new trial. If, in that new trial, 
Whitmore is again convicted and sentenced to death, he would once more seek 
review of the sentence by the Supreme Court of Arkansas; that court would 
compare Whitmore’s case with other capital cases to insure that the death penalty 
is not freakishly or arbitrarily applied in Arkansas. Petitioner asserts that he would 
ultimately be injured by the State Supreme Court’s failure to review Simmons’ 
death sentence, because the heinous crimes committed by Simmons would not be 
included in the data base employed for Whitmore’s comparative review. The 
injury would be redressed by an order from this Court that the Eighth 
Amendment requires mandatory appellate review. 
495 U.S. 149, 156–57 (1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Brief for the Petitioner, 
Whitmore, 495 U.S. 149 (No. 88-7146), 1989 WL 1127486, at *21). 
 153. Id. at 157. 
 154. See id. at 157–58 (stating that petitioner’s theory of injury was insufficient to 
establish injury-in-fact for Article III standing). 
 155. This is true because, as Justice Breyer observed in his Clapper dissent, the Court 
has also applied several other standards to determine whether an alleged future harm was 
sufficiently imminent. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Taken 
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assumes that “certainly impending” and “substantial risk” are distinct 
standards, then each of the two standards is meant to be sufficient on 
its own to demonstrate cognizable injury. Further, the Court’s 
statement that a “certainly impending” injury is one that is not “too 
speculative for Article III purposes” suggests that the standard should 
be applied as a measure of probabilistic harm.156 This conclusion 
raises two questions that are essential to understanding how either 
standard should be applied in data breach litigation: what causes of 
action should demand that a court apply one of these two standards 
instead of the other,157 and what necessary minimum probability 
would render a harm cognizable?158 
 
together the case law uses the word ‘certainly’ as if it emphasizes, rather than literally 
defines, the immediately following term ‘impending.’	”). 
 156. See, e.g., id. at 1147 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2). Lujan 
offers mixed support for this assertion. The footnote that Clapper cites—and the sentence 
that the footnote supports—applied imminence as if it encompassed both the questions of 
whether and when the alleged harm would occur. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (concluding 
that imminence “has been stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff 
alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the 
injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff’s own control”). However, because the 
Court was reviewing a determination on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs 
had an evidentiary burden that was higher than at the pleading stage. Id. at 561. For 
instance, the Court would only accept as true those particular factual allegations that 
plaintiffs set forth at the summary judgment stage. Id. Moreover, because the Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs in Lujan were not the objects of the challenged government 
action, the Court scrutinized the plaintiffs’ evidence in an even more exacting manner. Id. 
at 562; see Scalia, supra note 17, at 894–95 (arguing that a plaintiff who challenges a 
government regulation but is not the object of that regulation cannot establish standing 
“[u]nless the plaintiff can show some respect in which he is harmed more than the rest of” 
the citizenry). Therefore, the Court’s inquiry as to when the plaintiffs professed to subject 
themselves to the asserted harm should be read as an evidentiary inquiry to determine 
probability that was necessitated by the stage of the litigation—not by the “certainly 
impending” standard itself. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64 (“Such ‘some day’ intentions—
without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the 
some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our 
cases require.”); Hessick, supra note 13, at 64 (asserting that Lujan “stated that imminence 
is relevant to justiciability only insofar as it relates to the probability that an injury will 
occur”). But see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (observing that an injury-in-fact “must be 
concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense”). 
 157. See Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three 
Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 261–69 (2014) 
(discussing different cases that have applied these two standards). For further discussion, 
see infra Section III.A.1. 
 158. See infra Part IV. For further discussion, see Hessick, supra note 13, at 65–73. 
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1.  Applying the “Certainly Impending” Standard in Disputes 
Between Private Parties 
The Supreme Court has never applied the “certainly impending” 
standard in a claim between two private parties; the standard has 
been limited to separation of powers cases in which a plaintiff asks a 
court to nullify an act of another branch of government.159 In fact, the 
Court has only applied the “certainly impending” standard fifteen 
times in its entire history.160 In thirteen of those cases, the plaintiffs 
sought declaratory or injunctive relief arising from a governmental 
action.161 In another case, a third party sought a stay of the execution 
of a capital defendant.162 In the sole remaining case, a group of states 
(and other parties) challenged an administrative agency’s denial of a 
rulemaking petition and the agency’s corresponding construction of a 
statute.163 Indeed, in each case except for the third-party standing 
case, Whitmore v. Arkansas,164 the plaintiffs sought to invoke the 
power of the judiciary against another branch of the federal 
government.165 
Whitmore presents a rather curious exception to the Court’s 
pattern of applying the “certainly impending” standard in separation 
of powers cases. In that case, Simmons, a capital defendant, elected to 
waive his right to appeal his sentence.166 The plaintiff—another 
capital inmate who had exhausted his own appellate review—sought 
to intervene in the case.167 As an injury, the plaintiff alleged that the 
state’s decision not to hear an appeal in Simmons’ case would deprive 
the plaintiff of comparative review should he somehow obtain habeas 
relief in the future.168 In holding that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was 
insufficiently immediate to be cognizable, the Court reasoned that the 
chain of events necessary for that injury to occur was too 
speculative.169 As an alternative, the plaintiff also asserted that he 
could demonstrate standing as a “next friend of	.	.	.	Simmons.”170 On 
 
 159. See F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming Mar. 2017). 
 160. When narrowed to the U.S. Supreme Court, both LEXIS and Westlaw searches 
performed in September 2016 of “certainly impending,” each generated fifteen results. 
 161. E.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 590 (1923). 
 162. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 151, 154 (1990). 
 163. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510–14 (2007). 
 164. See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 154. 
 165. E.g., Pennsylvania, 262 U.S. at 591. 
 166. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 153. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 157. 
 169. Id. at 159–60. 
 170. Id. at 161. 
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that point, the Court concluded that the plaintiff would not have 
satisfied the elements necessary to acquire “next friend” standing 
because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that Simmons was unable 
to litigate on his own behalf.171 
There is little reason to conclude that Whitmore offers courts a 
prescriptive precedent for applying the “certainly impending” 
standard outside of separation of powers cases. In the entire opinion, 
the Court only mentioned the standard once.172 The Court did not 
even purport to apply the standard to reach its ultimate holding on 
the issue.173 It is particularly notable that Whitmore was the first case 
in the history of the Supreme Court to articulate the “certainly 
impending” standard as a necessary requirement for standing and not 
merely as a condition that would suffice to establish injury-in-fact.174 
In light of these facts, the expression of the “certainly impending” 
standard in Whitmore should not be read as an authoritative 
statement of the Article III “case or controversy” requirement.175 
Lujan is the most instructive case on the application of the 
“certainly impending” standard as a necessary condition to establish 
injury-in-fact. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts advanced the notion 
that Article III courts were unsuited to provide redress for 
majoritarian concerns.176 Consequently, in cases challenging 
legislative or executive action, those courts applied a more rigorous 
standing doctrine in response to concerns about an unwarranted 
expansion of the federal judicial power.177 Lujan embodies that 
theoretical framework and ensures that “plaintiffs are alleging their 
 
 171. Id. at 161–66. As the Court explained in Whitmore, “	‘next friends’ appear in court 
on behalf of detained prisoners who are unable, usually because of mental incompetence 
or inaccessibility, to seek relief themselves.” Id. at 162. 
 172. See id. at 158. 
 173. See id. at 156–61. 
 174. Compare id. at 158 (“A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to 
constitute an injury-in-fact.” (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 
289, 298 (1979))), with Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 
(1979) (“But ‘[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to 
obtain preventative relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.’	” (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923))).  
 175. Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: Transformations in 
Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 93, 116 (1996) 
(“The cite in Whitmore to Pennsylvania thus appears to be an attempt to support a higher 
standard of injury with a precedent that, when properly read, does not lend itself to such 
support.”). 
 176. Hessick, supra note 20, at 296.  
 177. Id. at 294–98. 
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own, personal rights.”178 Thus, in a case where two parties dispute the 
invasion of a common law right, there is no theoretical justification 
for a more rigorous standing inquiry.179 
It is important to offer the caveat that the Court may not have 
intended to apply the “certainly impending” standard exclusively in 
separation of powers cases. Thus, the Court may not have intended 
for the standard to be applied more rigorously than any alternative 
standard, including the “substantial risk” standard. Nonetheless, 
because the Court has only applied the “certainly impending” 
standard in separation of powers cases, and the Court has generally 
applied standing doctrine more rigorously in these cases over the last 
three decades, it is now difficult to read the standard without 
reference to separation of powers principles. 
In contrast to cases that implicate separation of powers 
principles, in private rights cases, the Court’s insistence on factual 
injury limits plaintiffs’ abilities to obtain judicial relief in “claims that 
courts historically would have permitted.”180 The injury requirement 
poses a related but unique problem in data breach cases where 
plaintiffs allege so-called future injuries: the requirement routinely 
denies federal jurisdiction to claims that often present novel questions 
of state law.181 Thus, the application of the injury-in-fact requirement 
poses a modern-day Erie problem.182 If a plaintiff brings a claim that a 
state’s common law recognizes, then that plaintiff would nonetheless 
be barred from bringing that claim in federal court because abstract 
but binding federal precedent dictates that the resulting factual harm 
is insufficiently probable.183 Yet, that result seems curious as a 
 
 178. Id. at 298–300. Moreover, this reading of Lujan comports with Clapper; as in 
Clapper, the Court noted that the standing inquiry is more rigorous in separation of 
powers cases. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
 179. Hessick, supra note 20, at 304 (“In addition to being superfluous in cases involving 
private rights, the injury-in-fact requirement in such cases has depleted the requirement of 
objective meaning.”). 
 180. Id. at 277. 
 181. See, e.g., Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D. 
Ala. 2014). 
 182. Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 253 (2008) 
(“Properly understood, Erie sets forth a constitutional principle that federal judicial 
lawmaking cannot dictate substantive rights where such lawmaking has only an 
adjudicative rationale—that is, where it is justified solely on the basis that there is federal 
authority to adjudicate a dispute or to create procedures for such adjudication.” (citing 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))). 
 183. See Hessick, supra note 20, at 327 (“Requiring injury in fact in private rights cases 
has not simply resulted in the denial of standing to plaintiffs alleging the violation of 
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constitutional command that applies to all substantive claims because 
courts have long granted standing for other types of prospective 
injuries.184 In light of the historical application and theoretical 
justification for the “certainly impending” standard, courts assessing 
the imminence of future harms in data breach cases should apply the 
“substantial risk” standard that Clapper preserved instead, which 
notes that there must be a “substantial risk” that the future injury will 
occur.185 
IV.  THE ROLE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
If courts hearing data breach cases did apply the “substantial 
risk” standard instead of the “certainly impending” standard, the risk 
of future harm needed to establish injury would be quite low. 
Professor Andrew Hessick has offered a compelling argument that 
Article III only demands an exceedingly low minimum probability 
that an alleged harm will occur.186 At its essence, the injury 
requirement can be reduced to a simple inquiry: who is the right 
person to bring a particular claim?187 This inquiry, based on the 
historical application of the doctrine, would turn on adverseness.188 In 
this sense, even if a plaintiff alleges that he is only at a minimally 
increased risk of suffering a harm caused by an action that a 
defendant has already committed, then those two parties would have 
adverse interests. Because the parties would be adverse, the 
constitutional requirement would be satisfied.189 Hessick argues that 
courts could then apply prudential considerations to shape their 
jurisdictional limitations.190 With a clear distinction between a low 
 
private rights.	.	.	.	[M]ost important[ly], it presents the threat of limiting jurisdiction in 
future cases.”). 
 184. Hessick, supra note 13, at 67 (“[T]he fact that the injury might not occur does not 
render the claim nonjusticiable; otherwise, federal courts would lack jurisdiction to hear 
any claims for prospective relief because all potential future injuries have some chance of 
not transpiring.”); see, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990) (discussing 
how future injuries must be “real and immediate”). 
 185. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 186. Hessick, supra note 13, at 67 (“Whether there is an actual dispute between two 
parties is a binary question: there either is a dispute, or there is not. If a substantial risk of 
injury constitutes an actual dispute, a small risk of injury does as well. The degree of risk 
goes to the intensity of the dispute, not whether it exists at all.”). 
 187. E.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 468 (2008) 
(stating that the injury requirement “ensures that the federal courts hear only those 
disputes characterized by the kind of adversary relationship that makes a legal ‘case’ or a 
‘controversy’	”). 
 188. See supra note 18 and accompanying text  
 189. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 190. Hessick, supra note 13, at 91–92. 
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constitutional threshold for standing and any prudential 
considerations that a court might apply,191 a court that adopted this 
approach would “increase the legitimacy of judicial decisions by 
promoting transparency.”192 
In data breach cases, courts have held that preventative costs like 
credit monitoring are not cognizable injuries unless the threat of 
identity theft is sufficiently probable.193 For example, in addition to its 
central holding, Clapper held that mitigation expenses are merely 
future injuries when the alleged harms are not imminent.194 Yet, if 
imminence is simply a question of probability, then it is difficult to 
accept the notion that Article III commands both the aforementioned 
result in data breach cases and opposite results in cases arising from 
other causes of action such as toxic exposure or defective medical 
devices.195 Rather, courts are actually engaging in normative inquiries 
about the sorts of harms that should be cognizable.196 Courts could 
ensure more predictable, doctrinally sound outcomes in data breach 
cases by adopting Hessick’s test that only a minimal risk of harm is 
required to satisfy the factual injury requirement.197 However, a 
simpler and more direct solution198 in data breach cases would be to 
identify the disclosure of sensitive PII as a factual harm that could 
satisfy the factual injury requirement.199 
A. The Normative Nature of the Factual Injury Requirement 
In 1988, Judge William A. Fletcher of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit authored a seminal work on standing 
 
 191. Docket control is an example of one such consideration. See supra Section II.C. 
 192. Hessick, supra note 13, at 59. 
 193. E.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58047, at *5–6 (E.D. 
La. May 4, 2015). 
 194. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013). 
 195. See Galbraith, supra note 4, at 1391–92 (“In either case, notwithstanding greater 
harm that may result in the future, when a defendant creates a risk of harm requiring 
monitoring costs, whether they are medical or financial costs, the damage has been 
done.”). See generally Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1162–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing 
how different kinds of cases, such as environmental cases, found plaintiff standing based 
on a probabilistic or imminent risk of harm). 
 196. See infra Section IV.A. 
 197. See supra note 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 198. This solution would be simpler because it would encourage courts to permit more 
claims to proceed to the merits without requiring them to speculate about the likelihood of 
future events occurring. 
 199. See infra Section IV.C. 
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doctrine, The Structure of Standing.200 Fletcher’s critical insight into 
standing doctrine is that courts cannot apply the doctrine in both a 
singular and coherent manner to all types of substantive claims.201 
This is because the law provides remedies for the violation of legal 
rights, and those violations manifest themselves in different factual 
harms.202 Therefore, the controlling substantive legal authority, and 
not “disembodied and abstract application[s] of general principles of 
standing law[,]” dictates the acceptable legal injury and must then 
determine the outcome of the standing inquiry.203 
According to Fletcher’s positivist criticism of standing doctrine, 
judicial insistence on a demonstration of factual injury obstructs the 
essential question that the standing inquiry poses.204 Under this view, 
the factual injury requirement set forth in Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp is inherently inoperative 
“except in the relatively trivial sense of determining whether [the] 
plaintiff is telling the truth about her sense of injury.”205 Rather, when 
the Supreme Court applies a factual injury test to determine whether 
someone has been harmed, the Court is actually applying external, 
normative considerations about the sorts of harms that ought to be 
cognizable.206 Moreover, when the Court rejects the premise that it 
applies such norms, it necessarily fails to provide clear guidance to 
lower courts on how to apply them.207 The result is that lower courts 
then apply their own normative considerations disguised as 
formalistic tests to reach unpredictable and divergent outcomes.208 
B. Data Breach Claims Under State Law 
Data breach claims are often brought into federal court under 
state law claims.209 Many courts that have applied the factual injury 
 
 200. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 221; see also Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge 
Fletcher—And of General Standing Principles, 65 ALA. L. REV. 473, 473–74 (2013) 
(discussing the lasting significance of Fletcher’s work). 
 201. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 229. 
 202. Id. at 239. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. at 231. 
 205. Id. (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 
(1970)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See supra Section III.A. 
 208. See Elliot, supra note 187, at 501 (“No jurist can produce predictable results from 
a set of rules that arises from incoherence.”); Fletcher, supra note 10, at 231 (arguing that 
“the ‘injury-in-fact’ requirement cannot be applied in a non-normative way”). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. 
Supp. 3d 14, 21 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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test in data breach cases have reached inconsistent conclusions on 
similar facts,210 but one case illustrates the test’s normative nature 
particularly well. In re Science Applications International Corp. 
Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation (“SAIC”)211 considered the theft 
of tapes containing sensitive information—including the names and 
social security numbers—of millions of TRICARE beneficiaries.212 
The tapes were stolen from the car of a Science Applications 
International Corporation employee along with a GPS and a stereo.213 
Just one of the thirty-three plaintiffs in the suit alleged that the 
information that he provided to TRICARE had been misused.214 
The court held that the plaintiffs who did not allege misuse could 
not demonstrate that their injuries were “certainly impending.”215 In 
so holding, the court reasoned that the degree to which the plaintiffs 
were at a higher risk for identity theft was irrelevant under the 
“certainly impending” standard.216 The court first determined in a 
conclusory fashion that the alleged relevant harm was identity theft.217 
The court then observed that “the likelihood that any individual 
Plaintiff will suffer harm remains entirely speculative” because there 
was no indication that the thief would recognize that the tapes 
contained data or possess the tools or knowledge to decrypt that 
data.218 Finally, applying Clapper, the court held that the plaintiff’s 
mitigation expenses could not qualify as actual injuries because the 
alleged harm—identity theft—was not imminent.219 
Next, the court held that the plaintiffs who did not allege misuse 
could not demonstrate that their harms presented a sufficiently 
“substantial risk” of occurring to establish injury-in-fact.220 In so 
holding, the court noted that 19% of individuals whose data is 
exposed in a breach become victims of identity theft,221 and therefore, 
 
 210. See supra Sections II.A.–II.B. 
 211. 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 212. Id. at 19. TRICARE is the U.S. military’s health system. See About Us, 
TRICARE, http://www.tricare.mil/About [https://perma.cc/VG45-HHSY] (last updated Sept. 
14, 2016).  
 213. In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 
at 20. 
 214. Id. at 32. 
 215. Id. at 28. 
 216. Id. at 25. 
 217. Id. The court’s analysis thus failed to consider whether the substantive law 
recognized that expending resources to mitigate the invasion of a legal right could be a 
legal injury. See infra Section IV.C. 
 218. In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 25. 
 219. See id. at 26. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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over 80% of data breach victims were not likely to have their 
identities stolen.222 Moreover, and with little support for its 
conclusion, the court then noted that even fewer of the victims in this 
case were likely to become victims of identity theft because the theft 
was unsophisticated.223 
The SAIC court’s analysis demonstrates the normative nature of 
courts’ application of the factual injury test in data breach cases that 
arise under common law.224 The problems posed by the court’s 
construction of the term “certainly impending” have been 
addressed.225 Notably, though, the court also failed to define the term 
“substantial,” and indeed the term’s definition suggests that it invites 
a normative application.226 Thus, the court’s conclusion that a 19% 
chance of identity theft is insubstantial is not supported by a generally 
applicable empirical test. 
For example, imagine that a group of consumers who were 
exposed to a toxic chemical brought a common law claim against a 
business in the same jurisdiction as the SAIC plaintiffs. Assume that 
the exposure rendered the consumers with a 19% chance to develop a 
terminal cancer. It seems reasonable that the consumers who faced a 
19% risk of terminal cancer would regard that risk as quite 
substantial. Yet, the SAIC court’s test would erect a federal 
jurisdictional bar to those consumers’ claims—even though courts 
routinely permit such suits.227 Moreover, if the substantive body of 
law did provide a remedy for the preventative expenses necessary to 
detect both the onset of the terminal cancer and the occurrence of 
identity theft, then what would be the constitutional basis to 
recognize the harm in one case but not the other? Regardless of what 
the SAIC court should have done, this example demonstrates the 
normative nature of the applicable test.228 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. The plaintiffs pled many causes of action, including negligence. Id. at 21. 
 225. See supra Section III.A. 
 226. See Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 
143, at 1245 (defining “substantial” as “considerable in quantity: significantly great”); 
Considerable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 143, at 266 
(defining “considerable” as “large in extent or degree”); Significant, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 143, at 1159 (defining “significant” as 
“of a noticeably or measurably large amount”); Great, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 143, at 547 (defining “great” as “remarkable in 
magnitude, degree, or effectiveness”).  
 227. See Galbraith, supra note 4, at 1388–90. 
 228. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 229–34 (discussing the normative considerations 
that contribute to various applications of the injury-in-fact rule). 
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C. A Less Rigorous Standing Inquiry 
Another example of the incoherent, normative nature of 
standing doctrine in data breach litigation is the widespread 
agreement among courts that alleging misuse suffices to establish 
injury-in-fact, while merely alleging exposure to misuse does not 
suffice.229 Both exposure and misuse of PII are harms that are 
sufficiently concrete to allow identification of particular parties with 
adverse interests. Moreover, both exposure and misuse are factual 
harms that are unrelated to the question of whether the applicable 
substantive law provides a remedy for the preventative measures that 
an affected consumer would likely take. Given that there is no 
applicable empirical test to determine when a risk of harm is 
sufficiently substantial to become imminent (or that such a test could 
be consistently applied), it seems doubtful that a distinction between 
exposure and misuse of PII is necessarily appropriate. For example, 
mere exposure of a consumer’s social security number could make a 
consumer vulnerable to a more severe and enduring risk than actual 
misuse of a credit card if the card brand refunded the fraudulent 
expense and closed the account. 
Courts can resolve this doctrinal incoherence by allowing claims 
where plaintiffs in data breach litigation allege disclosure of sensitive 
PII230 to proceed to the appropriate inquiry on the merits. Courts 
could do so in two ways that should satisfy the constitutional demands 
imposed by Article III: by applying the “substantial risk” standard 
while requiring only a low probability of a harm’s occurrence for less 
sensitive PII, or by recognizing exposure of sensitive PII as a 
cognizable injury. Because the substantive law of various states differs 
on critical aspects of a data breach claim, such as the provision of 
damages for measures taken to prevent financial loss incurred after 
one’s sensitive PII is exposed in a data breach,231 there should not be a 
jurisdictional bar from bringing such claims in some federal courts 
and not others when the claims arise from identical facts. One may or 
may not have a right to keep one’s data from being breached, but 
regardless of how one answers that question, the ultimate arbiter 
should be the relevant substantive law. 
 
 229. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 230. Sensitive PII would include all information capable of resulting in economic harm, 
such as financial information or social security numbers. 
 231. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Allowing more consumers to establish standing in data breach 
litigation does not mean that a new flood of cases would necessarily 
proceed to trial. Parties must still bring a dispute to the court that 
warrants judicial resolution. Alleging that a data breach caused the 
disclosure of one’s name and phone number, for example, would 
probably not expose someone to any significant risk of financial loss. 
Moreover, if these claims survived the standing inquiry, they would 
still be susceptible to motions to dismiss or summary judgment 
motions. Courts’ inquiries at those stages of the proceedings could be 
better tailored to the requirements of the applicable state law, and 
litigants would also gain the benefit of being better able to forecast 
their liability and take the necessary measures to prevent litigation 
altogether. 
The differences in requirements for actionable claims under the 
substantive law of various states also demonstrate the need for 
Congress to enact a federal data security scheme with a private right 
of action. Data breach cases arising from the security practices of 
large retailers can include plaintiffs from all fifty states.232 One large 
claim can accordingly raise novel questions of many states’ laws and 
complicate litigation strategies. Moreover, consumers should be 
entitled to some redress if corporations fail to maintain reasonable 
security standards. Credit card brands can mandate that their 
interests are protected,233 but if these claims cannot be maintained as 
class actions, many consumers could be unable to maintain their own 
separate actions. Until Congress acts, however, standing doctrine 
should not obstruct litigation from shaping the development of 
reasonable data security standards. 
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